Efeitos da adoção das IFRS sobre o tax avoidance by Braga, Renata Nogueira
R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 28, n. 75, p. 407-424, set./dez. 2017
ISSN 1808-057X
DOI: 10.1590/1808-057x201704680
*Article presented at the XVI International Conference in Accounting, São Paulo, SP, Brazil, July 2016.
407
Effects of IFRS adoption on tax avoidance*
Renata Nogueira Braga
Universidade de São Paulo, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade, Departamento de Contabilidade e Atuária, São Paulo, SP, 
Brazil
Received on 11.12.2016 – Desk acceptance on 01.09.2017 – 2nd version approved on 05.18.2017
ABSTRACT
This study investigates the association between mandatory International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption 
and corporate tax avoidance. In this study, tax avoidance is defined as a reduction in the effective corporate income tax 
rate through tax planning activities, whether these are legal, questionable, or even illegal. Three measures of tax avoidance 
are used and factors at the country and firm level (that have already been associated with tax avoidance in prior research) 
are controlled. Using samples that range from 9,389 to 15,423 publicly-traded companies from 35 countries, covering 1999 
to 2014, it is found that IFRS adoption is associated with higher levels of corporate tax avoidance, even when the level of 
book-tax conformity required in the countries and the volume of accruals are controlled, both of which are considered 
potential determinants of this relationship. Furthermore, the results suggest that after IFRS adoption, firms in higher book-
tax conformity environments engage more in tax avoidance than firms in lower book-tax conformity environments. It is 
also identified that engagement in tax avoidance after IFRS adoption derives not only from accruals management, but also 
from practices that do not involve accruals. The main conclusion is that companies engage more in tax avoidance after 
mandatory IFRS adoption.
Keywords: IFRS, tax avoidance, book-tax conformity, tax planning.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The introduction of an international accounting 
standard aims to harmonize the financial information 
companies present. The hope is that mandatory 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
adoption increases transparency and comparability in 
the preparation and presentation of general purpose 
financial statements, thus enabling the capital and credit 
markets to function more efficiently (Brüggemann, Hitz, 
& Sellhorn, 2013). In light of the expected benefits of IFRS 
adoption, more than 120 countries have already adopted 
this set of international norms (IFRS Foundation, 2017). 
While various studies seek to identify whether there are 
informational benefits from IFRS adoption and what 
these are, the taxation related effects of this adoption have 
been scarcely explored. Simone (2015) notes that there is 
little research examining the relationship between IFRS 
adoption and tax planning.
This study therefore investigates the taxation effects of 
IFRS adoption; more specifically, whether IFRS adoption 
around the world is associated with higher levels of tax 
avoidance among publicly-traded companies. It also 
investigates: (i) how the relationship between mandatory 
IFRS adoption and corporate tax avoidance behaves 
in high and low book-tax conformity environments; 
and (ii) whether IFRS adoption has an impact on 
companies’ engagement in tax avoidance through accruals 
management, practices that do not involve accruals, or 
both.
Initially, the idea of adopting a new accounting 
standard would not lead to consequences in the area of 
taxation, especially considering that the aim of IFRS is 
to provide more useful information to users in general 
and that such a set of norms does not aim to serve any 
specific needs, such as those of tax authorities. However, 
alterations in taxable income and in tax planning activities, 
especially in activities that increase levels of tax avoidance, 
may have occurred with the adoption of IFRS.
With IFRS adoption, countries with a high level of 
book-tax conformity that used local generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) as a basis or starting point 
for calculating taxable income, and/or that had strong links 
between reported earning and taxable income, needed 
to define their rules for elaborating financial statements 
for tax purposes. Many jurisdictions that adopted IFRS 
for the purposes of preparing and presenting financial 
statements continued to require the local GAAP to be 
kept as a starting point for calculating taxes (Deloitte, 
2010). Along these lines, Chan, Lin, and Mo (2010), 
Chan, Lin, and Tang (2013), Chen and Gavious (2015), 
and Karampinis and Hevas (2013) have identified that 
after IFRS adoption some distancing occurred between 
the rules for the preparation and presentation of general 
purpose financial statements and those for taxation 
purposes; that is, there was a reduction in the level of 
book-tax conformity.
Atwood, Drake, Myers, and Myers (2012), Chan et al. 
(2010, 2013), Desai (2005), and Tang (2015) indicate that 
a decrease in the level of book-tax conformity increases 
the level of corporate tax avoidance. Researchers that 
have identified this relationship have mainly based their 
findings on the fact that managers in high conformity 
environments face a book-tax trade-off in which any 
decision to discretionarily reduce taxable income affects 
the value of the profit that will be reported to external 
users. According to Desai (2005), Hanlon, Laplante and 
Shevlin (2005), and Hanlon and Shevlin (2005), when 
the level of book-tax conformity decreases, managers 
do not face the book-tax trade-off and there is thus no 
longer this greater constraint on them reporting profits 
in the most convenient way. Strong evidence that IFRS 
adoption may have affected tax avoidance levels can thus 
be identified via the indirect relationship between these 
two variables; IFRS adoption has reduced required levels 
of book-tax conformity and lower book-tax conformity 
is associated with greater tax avoidance.  
Another condition that may establish a relationship 
between mandatory IFRS adoption and increased levels 
of tax avoidance is the possible increase in discretionary 
and non-discretionary accruals identified after IFRS 
adoption. Ahmed, Neel, and Wang (2013) and Lin, 
Riccardi, and Wang (2012) documented an increase in 
the aggressiveness of accruals after IFRS adoption. Atwood 
et al. (2012), Frank, Lynch, and Rego (2009), and Wilson 
(2009) identified that greater aggressiveness of accruals 
is associated with increased tax avoidance. Given that an 
increase in accruals was identified after IFRS adoption 
and that aggressiveness of accruals is associated with a 
higher level of tax avoidance, then IFRS adoption may 
have indirectly contributed to increasing tax avoidance. 
Other evidence that IFRS adoption can affect the activities 
that increase tax avoidance was identified by Simone 
(2015). This author found an increase in profit transfers 
for taxation purposes, from jurisdictions with higher tax 
burdens to jurisdictions with lower tax burdens, after the 
adoption of IFRS.
According to De George, Li, and Shivakumar (2016), 
the first studies on IFRS mostly present the benefits 
of adoption for companies and countries in terms of 
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improved transparency, investments between countries, 
comparability of financial statements, reduced cost of 
capital, and an increase in foreign analysts. More recent 
studies attribute the occurrence of at least one of the 
benefits mentioned to other factors, such as changes in 
a country’s enforcement. It is noted that the literature 
on IFRS has sought to identify the impacts of adopting 
this accounting standard on the quality of financial 
information and its repercussions. This study thus intends 
to fill gaps in the scarce literature on IFRS adoption and 
its taxation effects. 
Hanlon et al. (2005) verified that both reported 
earnings and taxable income provide additional 
information for investors. Thus, it is of key importance 
for investors and capital market users to know whether 
taxable income, which provides information used in 
the decision-making process of resource allocation, is 
being manipulated to reduce tax expenses. Knowing 
if IFRS adoption is associated with a higher level of 
tax avoidance is also of interest to the governments of 
countries adopting the new set of accounting norms 
and countries that are thinking about adopting them, 
since it enables them to know how the behavior of the 
revenues derived from corporate income tax may have 
been or are affected by IFRS adoption. The study can 
thus contribute to the literature on this topic, which is of 
interest to governments, companies, and investors, and 
which contains little empirical evidence. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS
2.1 Tax Avoidance 
There are no universally accepted definitions or 
constructs for tax avoidance, which is a challenge for 
research in the area. The term can mean different things 
to different people. The lack of a universally accepted 
definition should not, however, prevent research on the 
topic; on the contrary, the more better studies are carried 
out, the greater the possibility of an acceptable definition 
taking form (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010).
For Slemrod (2004), tax avoidance is defined as legal 
actions that aim to reduce tax liabilities. The limitation of 
the definition to only legal actions is debated, especially 
in light of the argument of the difficulty in determining 
which activities executed in order to reduce tax burdens 
are legal and which are not (Atwood et al., 2012; Dyreng, 
Hanlon, & Maydew, 2008; Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). 
Supporting the discussions regarding the difficulty in 
distinguishing between legal and illegal activities, Dyreng 
et al. (2008) note the existence of many areas in which tax 
law is unclear, especially for complex transactions, which 
can result in questionable interpretations.
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) therefore mention 
that they do not technically distinguish the legal act of 
avoiding taxation from the illegal act, for two reasons: 
(i) most of the behaviors in question revolve around 
transactions that are generally considered as technically 
legal and (ii) the legality of tax avoidance transactions 
is generally determined after the fact. Along these far-
reaching lines, Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin (2010) 
define tax avoidance as management that aims to reduce 
taxable income through tax planning activities, whether 
these are legal, questionable, or even illegal. The term tax 
avoidance, as in Atwood et al. (2012), Dyreng et al. (2008), 
and Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), is used in this study as 
a generic term, covering the terms “tax non-compliance”, 
“tax sheltering”, “tax evasion”, and “tax aggressiveness”, 
since there is no intention to suggest any irregularity on 
the part of companies, but rather to learn if they are able 
to avoid paying corporate income tax.
2.2 IFRS and Tax Avoidance
According to the IFRS Foundation Constitution 
(2013), the aim of the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) is to develop, by taking the public interest 
into account, a single set of high quality, comprehensible, 
executable, and globally accepted accounting standards 
based on clearly articulated principles. These standards 
should require high quality, transparent, and comparable 
information in order to help investors, capital market 
participants around the world, and accounting information 
users to take economic decisions. In observing the aim 
of the IASB, it is noted that the focus of IFRS is to enable 
financial statements to be elaborated in a way that they 
provide useful information for the economic decision-
making of users in general, and that IFRS are not intended 
to serve the specific needs of tax authorities. 
Initially, the idea of adopting a new accounting 
standard would not lead to taxation consequences; 
however, IFRS adoption may have affected companies’ 
taxable income. In adopting IFRS, countries with a high 
level of book-tax conformity needed to define between: (i) 
also using IFRS as a basis for calculating taxable income, 
thus maintaining levels of conformity high; (ii) using 
IFRS to prepare and present general purpose financial 
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statements and maintaining local GAAP as the basis for 
calculating taxable income, thus reducing the level of 
conformity, and (iii) creating standards for tax purposes 
independent of the GAAP used, thus reducing the level 
of conformity. In adopting IFRS, countries with a low 
level of conformity could: (i) use IFRS to prepare and 
present general purpose financial statements and maintain 
the already existing legislation for tax purposes, thus 
maintaining a low level of conformity or (ii) also start 
using IFRS as the basis for calculating taxable income, 
thus increasing the level of conformity. 
It is therefore verified that depending on the level of 
book-tax conformity and the country’s decision to maintain 
or modify this level of conformity after adopting IFRS, 
companies’ taxable income could be affected. According to 
Deloitte (2010), many jurisdictions that adopted IFRS with 
the aim of preparing and presenting financial statements 
continued to require the local GAAP to be kept as the 
basis for calculating tax. Thus, the studies from Chan et al. 
(2010, 2013), Chen and Gavious (2015), and Karampinis 
and Hevas (2013) mention that after IFRS adoption, there 
was some distancing between the financial statements 
for general purposes and those for tax purposes. One of 
the factors that could explain the decision of countries 
to keep the old local rules for calculating tax is the fact 
that IFRS gives managers greater discretion in choosing 
the accounting methods that best reflect companies’ 
economic and financial reality (Chan et al., 2010) in 
order to achieve the goal of making financial statements 
more useful for external users. The discretion given to 
managers to choose the methods to be used in preparing 
of general purpose financial statements is questioned and 
generally not accepted by tax authorities for calculating 
taxable income. The reduction in the level of book-tax 
conformity experienced by various countries when IFRS 
was adopted may have had an impact on the activities 
that increase levels of tax avoidance, given that there is 
empirical evidence that a low level of conformity can lead 
to an increase in the level of tax avoidance (Atwood et al., 
2012; Chan et al., 2010, 2013; Desai, 2005; Tang, 2015).
When there is a high level of book-tax conformity, an 
increase in financial earnings generally implies an increase 
in taxable income, thus resulting in a higher level of tax 
liabilities for companies, which they would presumably 
prefer to avoid (Hanlon et al., 2005). Thus, a reduction 
in taxable income generally implies a reduction in the 
accounting earning reported in the capital markets (Hanlon 
& Shevlin, 2005). If companies opt for transactions that 
generate book-tax differences in order to achieve the best 
of both worlds (high reported earnings and low taxable 
income), it could raise suspicions that one or possibly both 
measures of earnings have been opportunistically reported 
(Hanlon et al., 2005). In contrast, when the level of book-
tax conformity is low, managers do not face the book-tax 
trade-off and there is thus not the greater constraint to 
report earnings in the most convenient way for them. In 
this setting, companies more easily avoid paying tax by 
using strategies that create book-tax differences, which 
are less costly strategies. As a result, companies located 
in countries with a low level of book-tax conformity tend 
to engage more in tax avoidance (Atwood et al., 2012).
Another indirect relationship between IFRS adoption 
and levels of tax avoidance can be established via increases 
in discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. Greater 
aggressiveness of accruals was identified after the adoption 
of IFRS (Ahmed et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2012). This increase 
in the aggressiveness of accruals may be due to the greater 
flexibility given to managers after IFRS adoption, since 
this set of accounting standards is based on principles and 
does not have any detailed guides for implementation. 
Given that managers have incentives to exploit accounting 
discretion in their favor, increased discretion after IFRS 
adoption will probably lead to more earnings management, 
ceteris paribus (Ahmed et al., 2013).
Atwood et al. (2012) suggest that tax avoidance and 
earnings management are like two sides of the same coin, 
given that managers have incentives for both: increasing 
reported earnings and decreasing taxable income. Frank et 
al. (2009) thus show a strong positive relationship between 
tax avoidance and aggressiveness in the preparation and 
presentation of general purpose financial statements. The 
authors found that if a company has the possibility of 
managing its reported earnings upwards and its taxable 
income downwards in the same period, it will engage in 
this behavior. Given that IFRS adoption is related to an 
increase in the aggressiveness of accruals and that a higher 
level of aggressiveness of accruals is positively associated 
with a higher level of tax avoidance, IFRS adoption may 
have contributed to an increase in tax avoidance. 
Another point that warrants attention is the increase in 
reported earnings via accruals after the adoption of IFRS. 
Increased reported earnings can cause an increase in tax 
avoidance, without there in fact being an increase in the 
practices that avoid paying tax. The tax avoidance metrics 
that involve the effective tax rate (ETR) generally take 
pre-tax earnings as their denominator; if these earnings 
increase and tax remains constant, the effective tax rate 
will be reduced due to the increase in the denominator 
and an increase in tax avoidance will be identified, but 
not due to specific behaviors to reduce taxation. It bears 
mentioning, however, that if an increase in reported 
earnings resulting from an increase in accruals, whether 
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discretionary and/or non-discretionary, remains in the 
long run, then the company is avoiding taxation on this 
overestimated reported earnings, thus reflecting the 
practice of tax avoidance (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010).
IFRS adoption can also affect the level of tax avoidance 
of entities due to other factors. Simone (2015) verified 
that subsidiary companies in the European Union became 
more involved in profit transfers for tax reasons after 
the adoption of IFRS, estimating that on average those 
subsidiaries that mandatorily adopted IFRS transferred 
11.5% more profit in relation to subsidiaries in the pre-
adoption years and subsidiaries that did not adopt IFRS. 
The European Union countries follow the guidelines 
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) for setting transfer pricing. The 
preferred method is to obtain information on specific 
contractual terms celebrated with or by independent 
companies for comparable transactions. Since the 
availability of this information is limited, multinational 
entities generally use reference transfer prices, identifying 
a set of observable, economically comparable, and 
independent companies, which use similar accounting 
standards to compare profit margins. Thus, the adoption 
of a single standard such as IFRS by various jurisdictions 
expands the set of companies that can be used as potential 
references and can enable multinational entities to choose 
more favorable references to support transfer pricing with 
tax advantages (Simone, 2015).
Based on the reasons mentioned, which show that 
mandatory IFRS adoption may have positively affected 
levels of corporate tax avoidance, the following hypothesis 
is formulated:
H1: mandatory IFRS adoption is associated with a 
higher level of tax avoidance.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1 Regression Model Specification
In order to test the effect of IFRS adoption on tax avoidance, the following model was used:
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝛼1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑗,𝑡 +  �𝛼𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡
in which: i indexes firm; t indexes time (year); j indexes 
country; TaxAvoid = measure of tax avoidance (models 
2, 3, and 4 presented below); αt = year-fixed effect; αind 
= industry-fixed effect based on the classification of 30 
industries from Fama-French; IFRS = dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 after mandatory IFRS adoption 
by country j and 0 in other cases; and Control = control 
variables at the country level and at the firm level.
1
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3.1.1 Dependent variable — tax avoidance
The first metric for tax avoidance used in this study 
indicates the total taxation that a company is able to avoid 
in relation to the amount calculated by applying the tax 
rate in the company’s country of origin on pre-tax earnings 
before exceptional items. This metric was proposed by 
Atwood et al. (2012):
𝑇𝐴1𝑖 ,𝑡 =  ∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐸𝐵𝑋 𝑥 𝜏 𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡−2 −  ∑ 𝐶𝑇𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡𝑡−2∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐸𝐵𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡−2
in which: i indexes firm; t indexes time (year); PTEBX 
– pre-tax earnings before exceptional items; τ = home-
country statutory corporate income tax rate; and CTP = 
current tax payable. 
PTEBX is the value of pre-tax earnings (Item PI — 
code referring to the Compustat databases, which are the 
reference for the following items in this article) minus the 
value of exceptional items (Item SPI). The values for τ were 
collected manually from EY (2015), KPMG (2015), and 
the Tax Foundation (2015). CTP is the current tax expense 
(Item TXC) minus the variation in income tax payable 
(Item TXP). If there are no data regarding current tax 
expenses, total tax expenses minus deferred tax expenses 
(Item TXT — Item TXDI) are used, if available.
As in Atwood et al. (2012), TA1 was estimated using 
a three year window, since this period was considered 
adequate for reducing the effects of items that are reverted 
in only one year and does not restrict the size of the 
sample like the use of a five or 10 year window would. 
To calculate the TA1 variable, three consecutive years of 
positive PTEBX are required.
The other tax avoidance metrics (TA2 and TA3) used in 
this study were based on the proposal from Tang (2013). 
To estimate tax avoidance, the difference between the 
home-country statutory corporate income tax rate and the 
the current effective tax rate were used, with the effective 
rate being measured by dividing the current tax expense 
by pre-tax earnings before exceptional items (model 3) 
and by dividing the current tax expense by operating 
cash flow (model 4).
𝑇𝐴2𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛕𝒊,𝒋 − 𝐶𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑇𝐸𝐵𝑋𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴3𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛕𝒊,𝒋 − 𝐶𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡
in which: CTE = current tax expense; OCF = operating 
cash flow. All of the other variables have already been 
previously defined.
To measure the CTE, first data on the current tax 
expense (Item TXC) were used, and in cases in which 
such data were not available, the total tax expense minus 
the deferred tax expense (Item TXT — Item TXDI) was 
used. τ and PTEBX were measured in the same way as in 
model 2. OCF is earnings before extraordinary items (Item 
IB) minus total accruals. Total accruals were measured 
in the following way: the variation in current assets that 
are not cash flow (Item ACT — Item CHE) minus the 
variation in the current liabilities that are not loans and 
financing (Item LCT — Item DCL) minus depreciation 
(Item DP). In agreement with Tang (2015), observations 
with a negative OCF were eliminated. Effective rates of 
current tax expense with a value of greater than 1 were 
substituted by 1. To measure the variables TA1, TA2, and 
TA3, observations with a negative current tax expense 
were eliminated. To remove the influence of potential 
outliers, the winsorize technique was used for the variables 
TA1, TA2, and TA3 in the 1st and 99th percentiles for 
each year.
2
3
4
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3.1.2 Control variables.
Control variables that have already presented a 
significant association with tax avoidance in previous 
studies were used. The control variables were divided 
into control variables at the country level and at the firm 
level. At the country level, the following were controlled: 
(i) home-country statutory corporate income tax rate, 
collected manually from the EY (2015), KPMG (2015), 
and Tax Foundation (2015) websites, and (ii) institutional 
factors: legal enforcement (LegEnf), investor rights 
(InvRig), and ownership concentration (OwnConc), 
developed by Kaufmann and Kraay (2015), Djankov, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), and La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), respectively. 
The LegEnf variable is calculated as the average of three 
variables: regulatory quality, rule of law, and the level of 
corruption in a country. It varies from -2.5 to +2.5 and the 
lower it is, the lower the legal enforcement in the country. 
The InvRig variable is an indicator of investor rights; it 
varies from 0 to 6 and the higher the indicator, the greater 
investor rights. The OwnConc variable represents the 
ownership concentration in a country, and the higher it 
is, the greater that ownership concentration.
At the firm level the following were controlled: (i) 
profitability (Pre-TaxROA), measured as pre-tax earnings 
before exceptional items (Item PI — Item SPI) divided 
by lagged total assets; (ii) firm size (LogSize), using the 
natural log of total assets; leverage (Leverage), calculated 
as total debt (Item DLTT + Item DLC) divided by total 
assets (Item AT); and (iv) growth in sales (SalesGrth), 
as the variation in revenue divided by lagged revenue 
(variation in Item REVT divided by Item REVT lagged). 
To measure the LogSize variable, all of the assets were 
converted into dollars using the daily conversion rate 
available from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S) database. For all of the other control variables 
at the firm level, the winsorize technique was used in the 
1st and 99th percentiles for each year.
3.2 Book-Tax Conformity Regression Model
Given that IFRS adoption may have caused a reduction 
in book-tax conformity, which in turn may cause in 
an increase in tax avoidance, it was verified how the 
association between IFRS adoption and tax avoidance 
behaves when the level of conformity between reported 
earnings and taxable income is kept constant and whether 
this association differs in high and low conformity 
environments. To do so, the level of book-tax conformity 
in the countries over the years was measured using the 
metric proposed by Atwood, Drake, and Myers (2010). 
The authors modeled book-tax conformity as the amount 
of the variation in the current tax expense that is not 
explained by the variation in pre-tax earnings.
𝐶𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃2𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡
in which: i indexes firm; t indexes time (year); CTE = 
current tax expense; PTBI = pre-tax earnings; DIV = total 
dividends; and e = error. 
In the original model there was also the ForPTBI 
variable, which is the estimated pre-tax foreign earnings. 
The authors, however, estimated the model without this 
variable and the results were qualitatively similar. Due to 
the permanence of the results without this variable and the 
limitation of the databases used, in which the data needed 
to estimate it were not available, the variable was removed 
from the model. CTE is the total tax expense (Item TXT) 
minus the deferred tax expense (Item TXDI). If there 
are no data regarding the TXDI or TXT, the current tax 
expense (Item TXC) is used, if available. Total dividends 
(Item DVT) were included in the model to control for 
potential cross-sectional differences in the current tax 
expenses related to the distribution of dividends. For 
countries with fewer than eight observations with DIV ≠ 0 
in a particular year, the values that were different to zero 
in that year are set equal to zero. In cases in which there 
are missing values, it is assumed that DIV is equal to 
zero. In order to control differences in the cross-sectional 
scale, CTE, PTBI, and DIV are divided by average total 
assets (Item AT). All of the firm-year observations with 
negative PTBI or CTE were removed. In order to remove 
potential outliers, the winsorize technique was used in 
the 1st and 99th percentiles of the variables CTE, PTBI, 
and DIV for each year.
The estimated model is for country-year in order to 
enable changes in tax rates and in book-tax conformity 
between countries and within the same country over 
time. A higher (lower) root mean-squared error (RMSE) 
indicates lower (higher) book-tax conformity. For the 
regression analysis, the countries were ranked (decreasing 
5
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ranking) every year based on the RMSE from model 5. As 
in Atwood et al. (2010), the highest RMSE in the year was 
ranked as 0 and the lowest RMSE in the year was ranked 
as n-1, in which n is the number of countries included in 
that year. Then it was divided by n-1 so that the ranking 
scale varied between 0 and 1; those countries with higher 
positions in the ranking in a given year have greater 
book-tax conformity. The scaled result of the ranking is 
the BTaxC variable. 
To verify how the association between IFRS adoption 
and tax avoidance behaves when the level of book-tax 
conformity is kept constant, the following model was used:
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝛼1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛼2𝐵𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐶𝑗,𝑡 +  �𝛼𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖 ,𝑡
in which: BtaxC = level of book-tax conformity required, 
measured in accordance with model 5. All of the other 
variables have already been previously defined.
To verify if the association between mandatory IFRS 
adoption and tax avoidance differs between high and low 
book-tax conformity environments, model 7 was used, 
and then the difference of coefficient test was carried out 
between coefficients α1 and α2 of the following model.
in which: HighBTaxC = 1 if BTaxC is above the median 
and 0 if it is below the median; LowBTaxC = 1 if BTaxC 
is below the median and 0 if it is above the median. All of 
the other variables have already been previously defined.
To determine the countries that are above and below 
the median, an increasing ranking of the countries that 
compose the sample was carried out based on the average 
book-tax conformity required for each country during the 
study period. The countries below the ranking median 
are those that present low book-tax conformity and the 
countries above the ranking median are those that present 
high book-tax conformity.
3.3 Regression Model with Accruals
In order to achieve the objective of verifying whether 
IFRS adopted has had an impact on companies’ engagement 
in tax avoidance through accruals management, practices 
that do not involve accruals, or both, total accruals is 
included in regression model 6. By including total accruals 
it is possible to control the relationship between an increase 
in the aggressiveness of accruals and tax avoidance and 
between an increase in reported earnings through accruals 
after IFRS adoption and tax avoidance.
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝛼1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑥𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐵𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐶𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑥𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐵𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐶𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛼3𝐵𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐶𝑗,𝑡+ �𝛼𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝛼1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐵𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐶𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 +  �𝛼𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡
in which: TotAcc = total accruals. The other variables have 
already been previously defined. 
TotAcc is calculated in accordance with Atwood et al. 
(2012) and is obtained using the sum of the variation in 
working capital that is not cash flow (ΔWC), the variation 
in net non-current operating assets (ΔNCO), and the 
variation in net financial assets (ΔFIN). WC is measured 
using current operating assets (Item ACT — Item CHE) 
minus current operating liabilities (Item LCT — Item DLC) 
divided by total average assets [(Item ATt + Item ATt-1)/2]. 
NCO is obtained from non-current operating assets (Item 
AT — Item ACT — Item IVAEQ — Item IVAO) minus 
non-current operating liabilities (Item LT — Item LCT 
— Item DLTT) divided by total average assets. FIN is 
measured by financial assets (Item IVST + Item IVAEQ 
+ Item IVAO) minus financial liabilities (Item DLTT + 
Item DLC + Item FUSEO) divided by total average assets. 
To control potential outliers, the winsorize technique 
was applied in the 1st and 99th percentiles of the variables 
ΔWC, ΔNCO, and ΔFIN for each year.
6
7
8
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3.4 Sample Selection and Data
The study sample was selected based on all of the 
firm-year observations, from 1999 to 2014, with data 
available from the Compustat Global and North America 
databases, in order to compute the variables in the models 
used in the study. All the observations from countries 
that are not in Djankov et al. (2008) and La Porta et al. 
(1998) were eliminated, since these studies developed 
metrics for the institutional factors that were used as 
control variables at the country level in this study, and 
all of the observations for the countries that did not 
adopt IFRS in the time interval studied. Subsequently, 
all of the observations for companies from the financial 
sector were eliminated, since in various countries the 
timeframe for IFRS adoption for this sector is different. 
For companies that changed reporting currency during 
the period analyzed, the firm-year observations from the 
year prior to the change in currency were eliminated, 
given the existence of control variables calculated based 
on the variation in a particular item.
Finally, following the research protocol adopted 
by Atwood et al. (2012), in order to generate greater 
comparability of the results at least 20 useful observations 
per country-year were required. Applying these criteria 
generated a sample composed of observations for 35 
countries, which in terms of economic representativeness 
were responsible for 36.5% of global gross domestic 
product (GDP) in 2015, according to The World Bank 
(2017).
The beginning of the study period was set in accordance 
with the year in which there are available data regarding 
the corporate income tax rate for the sample countries. 
The period was extended to 2014 to include most countries 
that have already adopted IFRS in the study. Table 1 
presents all of the sample countries and the year of IFRS 
adoption for each one.
4. RESULTS
4.1 Descriptive Statistic
Table 1 presents the median for the dependent variables 
in the study in an individualized way for each one of the 
35 countries analyzed. To estimate the median for the 
dependent variable TA1, 41,823 observations of 9,389 
companies included in regression model 1 were used. 
To estimate the median for the dependent variable TA2 
(TA3), 82,091 (81,786) observations of 14,766 (15,423) 
companies included in regression model 1 were used. As 
in Atwood et al. (2012), the median for the TA1 variable 
is high (low) for Australia, South Africa, and South Korea 
(Hong Kong and Singapore). Besides these countries, in 
this study, Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka (Finland, Ireland, Taiwan, and Turkey) also present 
a high (low) median for the TA1 variable.
The descriptive statistics were measured in the 2002-
2014 interval for the TA1 variable and all of the control 
variables and in the 2000-2014 interval for the TA2 and 
TA3 variables. The data regarding the 1999 financial year 
were used to calculate variables that needed data for the 
year prior to their measurement. As the TA1 variable is 
measured over three years, in order to calculate TA1 for 
2002, data for 2002, 2001, and 2000 were needed. The 
fact that the TA1 variable is calculated over three years 
explains the notable difference between the number of 
observations used in the regressions that include this 
variable and the number of observations used in the 
regressions that involve the TA2 and TA3 variables. Table 
1 also reveals the dispersion in the sample between the 
35 countries. It is noted that only the observations for 
Taiwan exceed the 10% representativeness of the sample.
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Table 1 Sample composition, International Financial Reporting Standards adoption date, and median for the dependent variables.
Country Adoption date n1 Percent TA1 n2 Percent TA2 n3 Percent TA3
Argentina 12/31/2012 325 0.78 0.350 585 0.71 0.350 611 0.75 0.350
Australia 12/31/2005 2,085 4.99 0.255 5,122 6.24 0.300 5,404 6.61 0.300
Austria 12/31/2005 310 0.74 0.105 602 0.73 0.128 633 0.77 0.227
Belgium 12/31/2005 501 1.20 0.150 886 1.08 0.168 927 1.13 0.275
Brazil 12/31/2010 1,379 3.30 0.298 2,411 2.94 0.340 2,373 2.9 0.340
Canada 12/31/2011 3,099 7.41 0.129 6,126 7.46 0.162 6,564 8.03 0.248
Chile 12/31/2010 767 1.83 0.091 1,204 1.47 0.105 1,205 1.47 0.149
Denmark 12/31/2005 590 1.41 0.068 1,075 1.31 0.067 1,128 1.38 0.184
Finland 12/31/2005 562 1.34 0.036 1,071 1.3 0.029 1,140 1.39 0.162
France 12/31/2005 3,027 7.24 0.181 5,165 6.29 0.188 5,080 6.21 0.289
Germany 12/31/2005 2,108 5.04 0.174 4,298 5.24 0.239 4,432 5.42 0.294
Greece 12/31/2005 506 1.21 0.137 1,151 1.4 0.191 1,208 1.48 0.211
Hong Kong 12/31/2005 363 0.87 0.036 718 0.87 0.042 716 0.88 0.089
Ireland 12/31/2005 139 0.33 0.010 311 0.38 0.028 303 0.37 0.071
Israel 12/31/2008 700 1.67 0.100 1,480 1.8 0.128 1,450 1.77 0.204
Italy 12/31/2005 828 1.98 0.087 1,553 1.89 0.054 1,636 2 0.226
Malaysia 12/31/2012 1,928 4.61 0.055 4,163 5.07 0.073 4,066 4.97 0.162
Mexico 12/31/2012 468 1.12 0.132 810 0.99 0.147 796 0.97 0.206
Netherlands 12/31/2005 622 1.49 0.133 1,235 1.5 0.157 1,264 1.55 0.230
Pakistan 12/31/2007 466 1.11 0.251 1,134 1.38 0.344 1,002 1.23 0.344
Peru 12/31/2012 409 0.98 0.231 672 0.82 0.300 684 0.84 0.300
Phillipines 12/31/2005 382 0.91 0.148 744 0.91 0.177 757 0.93 0.258
Portugal 12/31/2005 211 0.50 0.131 364 0.44 0.192 407 0.5 0.264
New Zealand 12/31/2007 429 1.03 0.147 832 1.01 0.280 802 0.98 0.280
Nigeria 12/31/2012 132 0.32 0.280 314 0.38 0.300 257 0.31 0.299
Norway 12/31/2005 463 1.11 0.183 1,106 1.35 0.230 1,188 1.45 0.259
Singapore 12/31/2005 1,911 4.57 0.044 3,982 4.85 0.043 3,699 4.52 0.115
Spain 12/31/2005 590 1.41 0.234 1,062 1.29 0.300 1,111 1.36 0.300
South Africa 12/31/2005 718 1.72 0.297 1,550 1.89 0.346 1,407 1.72 0.346
South Korea 12/31/2011 3,511 8.39 0.268 6,502 7.92 0.242 6,431 7.86 0.242
Sri Lanka 12/31/2012 196 0.47 0.263 554 0.67 0.325 510 0.62 0.325
Sweden 12/31/2005 1,566 3.74 0.113 2,819 3.43 0.131 2,882 3.52 0.211
Taiwan 12/31/2013 6,777 16.20 0.036 11,664 14.21 0.027 11,190 13.68 0.094
Turkey 12/31/2008 395 0.94 0.025 1,148 1.4 0.065 850 1.04 0.161
United Kingdom 12/31/2005 3,360 8.03 0.069 7,678 9.35 0.096 7,673 9.38 0.184
Total 41,823 82,091 81,786
Note: Adoption date: mandatory IFRS adoption date for the financial statements closed after December 31 [Deloitte (2015), 
IFRS Foundation (2017) and PwC (2014)]; n1, n2, n3: number of observations considered in the calculation of the median for 
variables TA1, TA2, and TA3 (tax avoidance measures), respectively; Percent: percentage of observations for a particular country 
in relation to the sample. 
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the 
variables for the whole sample. The averages for the 
dependent variables are similar and are 13% for TA1, 
12% for TA2, and 13.9% for TA3. Compared with the 
8.4% average found by Atwood et al. (2012), the higher 
level of tax avoidance for the study sample and period is 
evident. A reduction in the average corporate income tax 
rate is noted compared with previous studies. The average 
tax rate in Atwood et al. (2012) is 37.2%, in Tang (2015) 
it is 32%, and in this study, it is 27.7%. This variation may 
derive from the difference in the countries that compose 
the sample and the difference in the study periods. The 
studies mentioned are for 1993-2007 and 1994-2007, 
respectively, while this study is for 1999-2004. In an (non-
tabulated) estimation, the average corporate income tax 
rate for the countries analyzed in this study is 33.06% in 
2000, 28.83% in 2007, and 26.26% in 2014, thus portraying 
the reduction in the rate over the years.
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Table 2 Descriptive statistic
Variables n Companies Mean Standard Deviation 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile
TA1 41,823 9,389 0.130 0.167 0.015 0.123 0.259
TA2 82,091 14,766 0.120 0.210 0.002 0.160 0.290
TA3 81,786 15,423 0.139 0.232 0.060 0.215 0.299
TaxRate 41,823 9,389 0.277 0.060 0.245 0.280 0.330
LegEnf 41,823 9,389 1.173 0.695 0.757 1.323 1.789
InvRig 41,823 9,389 3.878 0.847 3.000 4.000 4.500
OwnConc 41,823 9,389 0.337 0.173 0.200 0.280 0.520
PreTaxROA 41,823 9,389 0.105 0.088 0.046 0.082 0.137
LogSize 41,823 9,389 5.788 1.939 4.400 5.563 7.012
Leverage 41,823 9,389 0.198 0.162 0.055 0.181 0.306
SalesGrth 41,823 9,389 0.124 0.400 -0.011 0.074 0.187
BTaxC 41,823 9,389 0.520 0.316 0.265 0.529 0.824
TotAcc 32,538 8,396 0.000 0.107 -0.044 0.001 0.043
Note: BTaxC: measure of book-tax conformity; companies: number of firms observed; LegEnf: measure of legal enforcement; 
InvRig: measure of investor rights; Leverage: measure of leverage; LogSize: measure of firm size; OwnConc: measure of 
ownership concentration; PreTaxROA: measure of profitability; SalesGrth: measure of sales growth; TA1, TA2, TA3: measures of 
tax avoidance; TaxRate: home-country statutory corporate income tax rate; TotAcc: measure of total accruals.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
The (non-tabulated) collinearity test was carried out 
and an average variance inflation factor (VIF) of 1.39 
and a highest VIF of 1.57 were found. A VIF below 10 is 
generally accepted, which suggests that the models used 
in this study do not present multicollinearity problems. 
Heteroskedasticity (Wald test) and autocorrelation 
(Wooldridge test) tests were carried out, which indicated 
that the models do not present heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation problems.
4.2 Multivariate Tests
Table 3 presents the result for the association between 
IFRS adoption and tax avoidance. Consistent with H1, 
IFRS adoption is positively associated with tax avoidance 
for all three forms of measurement of this variable. This 
result indicates that, on average, the companies started 
to engage more in tax avoidance after mandatory IFRS 
adoption.
Consistent with previous studies, it was found that 
TaxRate is positively associated with tax avoidance, 
indicating that the higher the corporate income tax 
rate, the more companies engage in tax avoidance. With 
regards to the institutional variables, a negative association 
was found between the LegEnf and OwnConc variables 
and tax avoidance and a positive association was found 
between InvRig and tax avoidance. This result suggests 
that tax avoidance is lower in countries with high legal 
enforcement and a high ownership concentration, which 
is in line with previous studies, and higher in countries 
with high investor protection.
When Slemrod (2004) discusses the economic model 
of the demand for tax evasion, he presents the probability 
of detecting evasion and punishment as one of the 
determining points for deciding to evade tax. In the area 
of empirical studies, Tang (2015) found that the stronger 
a country’s legal enforcement, the less companies engage 
in tax avoidance. Atwood et al. (2012), Badertscher, Katz 
and Rego (2013), and Chen et al. (2010) highlight that 
companies with a high ownership concentration tend to 
avoid taxation less. The authors argue that, in general, 
companies with a high ownership concentration are more 
concerned with the costs of evading taxes, such as the 
cost of penalty and of damage to the company’s image. 
The indication found in this study that high investor 
protection is associated with greater company engagement 
in tax avoidance diverges from the results found in 
previous studies, possibly because of the difference in 
sample and time of the studies or the way of measuring 
the variable. In the study from Tang (2015), no significant 
association was verified between these two variables. 
Atwood et al. (2012) controlled investor rights with 
another two institutional characteristics (ownership 
concentration and legal system) using a factor that was 
negatively associated with tax avoidance. 
In relation to the control variables at the firm level, 
it was found that companies with a higher PreTaxROA 
have higher tax avoidance for two of the regressions (1 
and 2) and lower tax avoidance for one of the regressions 
(3). The positive association between PreTaxROA and 
tax avoidance indicates that more profitable companies 
engage more in tax avoidance, which is consistent with 
Atwood et al. (2012), Dyreng et al. (2008), and Rego 
(2003). The latter highlights that companies with higher 
pre-tax returns have more incentives and resources to 
engage in tax planning. The negative association between 
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PreTaxROA and tax avoidance identified in regression 
3 may derive from the direct relationship between the 
metrics for these two variables. PreTaxROA takes pre-tax 
earnings as its numerator, the TA3 variable takes OCF 
as its denominator, and pre-tax earnings and OCF have 
a direct relationship, which can be both negative and 
positive.
Rego (2003) highlights that bigger companies have 
a higher effective income tax rate; that is, they engage 
in less tax avoidance, which is in agreement with the 
negative association between firm size and tax avoidance 
found in this study. Atwood et al. (2012) also identified a 
negative association between LogSize and tax avoidance 
and showed that this result is consistent with the behavior 
of bigger companies, which act to reduce potential political 
costs. As in Atwood et al. (2012), a positive association was 
found between Leverage and tax avoidance and between 
SalesGrth and tax avoidance, suggesting that the higher the 
degree of leverage and the growth in sales of a particular 
company, the more it engages in tax avoidance.
Table 4 presents the result for the association between 
IFRS adoption and tax avoidance after controlling for 
book-tax conformity. One of the main arguments of 
this study is that IFRS adoption can affect levels of tax 
avoidance because it causes a reduction in the level of 
book-tax conformity and there is evidence that companies 
in countries with low conformity present greater tax 
avoidance. However, the evidence found in this study 
indicates that there is a positive association between 
book-tax conformity and tax avoidance; that is, the higher 
the level of conformity between reported earnings and 
taxable income, the greater companies’ engagement in 
tax avoidance practices. This association can be explained 
by the fact that when a company located in a high book-
tax conformity environment decides to engage in tax 
avoidance, it can change its accounting choices and 
report lower accounting earnings in order to pay less tax. 
Previous studies suggest that firms subjected to a higher 
level of book-tax conformity alter their accounting choices 
to avoid taxation costs (Hanlon et al., 2005; Hanlon, 
Maydew, & Shevlin, 2008). Thus, in environments of 
high conformity between reported earnings and taxable 
income, if a company has more incentives to pay less tax 
than to report higher profits to the market, it will engage 
in tax avoidance and consequently reduce its accounting 
earnings.
Table 3 Effects of International Financial Reporting Standards adoption on tax avoidance
(1) (2) (3)
TA1 TA2 TA3
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
IFRS 0.066*** (29.566) 0.070*** (32.706) 0.060*** (25.337)
TaxRate 0.7881*** (57.07) 0.8268*** (63.52) 0.8468*** (55.31)
LegEnf -0.0376*** (-28.55) -0.0377*** (-31.5) -0.0261*** (-19.42)
InvRig 0.0245*** (26.23) 0.0236*** (27.33) 0.0154*** (16.44)
OwnConc -0.1051*** (-21.14) -0.1149*** (-24.96) -0.0663*** (-12.68)
PreTaxROA 0.1327*** (14.55) 0.2172*** (29.86) -0.2071*** (-28.06)
LogSize -0.0069*** (-16.27) -0.0099*** (-26.48) -0.0101*** (-25.99)
Leverage 0.0567*** (10.96) 0.0396*** (8,92) 0,0658*** (15,48)
SalesGrth 0.0299*** (12.55) 0.0058*** (6,253) 0,0046*** (5,068)
Constant -0.1389*** (-19.15) -0.1556*** (-21,66) -0,1229*** (-14,47)
Fixed Effect – Year Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effect – Industry Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.247 0.172 0.141
N 41,823 82,091 81,786
Note: this table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions that test the effect of IFRS adoption on tax avoidance. The 
standard errors are robust in terms of heteroskedasticity. 
LegEnf: measure of legal enforcement; IFRS: dummy variable for IFRS adoption; InvRig: measure of investor rights; Leverage: 
measure of leverage; LogSize: measure of firm size; OwnConc: measure of ownership concentration; PreTaxROA: measure of 
profitability; SalesGrth: measure of sales growth; TA1, TA2, TA3: measures of tax avoidance; TaxRate: home-country statutory 
corporate income tax rate. 
***: 1% statistical significance.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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Table 4 Effects of International Financial Reporting Standards adoption on tax avoidance with book-tax conformity control
(1) (2) (3)
TA1 TA2 TA3
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
IFRS 0.063*** (28.597) 0.069*** (32.495) 0.059*** (25.076)
BTaxC 0.0567*** (16.62) 0.058*** (19) 0.0426*** (12.82)
TaxRate 0.9756*** (53.72) 1.016*** (62.51) 0.9866*** (52.26)
LegEnf -0.0282*** (-19.64) -0.0294*** (-22.8) -0.0198*** (-13.55)
InvRig 0.0278*** (29.41) 0.027*** (31.23) 0.0179*** (19.08)
OwnConc -0.0987*** (-19.98) -0.1103*** (-23.89) -0.0632*** (-12.05)
PreTaxROA 0.1497*** (16.3) 0.2302*** (31.24) -0.2033*** (-27.8)
LogSize -0.0078*** (-18.42) -0.0109*** (-28.9) -0.0109*** (-27.65)
Leverage 0.0577*** (11.16) 0.0407*** (9.181) 0.0658*** (15.53)
SalesGrth 0.0301*** (12.51) 0.0061*** (6.507) 0.005*** (5.52)
Constant -0.2458*** (-24.79) -0.2679*** (-28.81) -0.2045*** (-19.34)
Fixed Effect – Year Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effect – Industry Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.253 0.175 0.143
N 41,823 82,091 81,786
Note: this table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions that test the effect of IFRS adoption on tax avoidance, 
controlling the level of book-tax conformity in the countries. The standard errors are robust in terms of heteroskedasticity.
BTaxC: measure of book-tax conformity; LegEnf: measure of legal enforcement; IFRS: dummy variable for IFRS adoption; InvRig: 
measure of investor rights; Leverage: measure of leverage; LogSize: measure of firm size; OwnConc: measure of ownership 
concentration; PreTaxROA: measure of profitability; SalesGrth: measure of sales growth; TA1, TA2, TA3: measures of tax 
avoidance; TaxRate: home-country statutory corporate income tax rate. 
***: 1% statistical significance.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Another possible explanation for the positive 
association between book-tax conformity and tax 
avoidance may be due to the loss of an alternative measure 
of performance when there is high conformity between 
reported earnings and taxable income, which probably 
causes a reduction in the ability to detect tax avoidance, 
given that previous studies have identified the use of 
book-tax differences to detect tax avoidance (Badertscher, 
Phillips, Pincus, & Rego, 2009).
The effect of IFRS adoption on tax avoidance remains 
the same after the book-tax conformity control. It is noted 
that the magnitude and direction of the IFRS variable 
coefficient is similar to the magnitude and direction of 
the coefficient of this same variable when there was no 
control for the level of book-tax conformity (Table 3). This 
result indicates that, independent of the level of book-tax 
conformity required in the country, companies started 
to engage more in tax avoidance after IFRS adoption.
Table 5 presents the result for the differentiated effect of 
the association between IFRS adoption and tax avoidance 
in high and low book-tax conformity environments. 
Despite the results presented in Table 4 showing that IFRS 
adoption positively affects tax avoidance independently of 
the level of book-tax conformity in the country, the results 
presented in Table 5 show that the positive association 
between these two variables is different depending on 
the level of book-tax conformity.
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The tests of coefficient equality reveal that the 
relationship between mandatory IFRS adoption and 
tax avoidance is significantly more positive for firms 
in countries with a high level of book-tax conformity. 
These results indicate that after IFRS adoption, companies 
in countries with a higher level of conformity between 
reported earnings and taxable income started to engage 
more in tax avoidance than companies in countries with a 
lower level of conformity. This result can be explained by 
the fact that when engaging in tax avoidance, companies 
in countries with high book-tax conformity tend to opt 
for practices that do not generate book-tax differences 
(so as not to raise suspicions that the earnings were 
reported opportunistically), such as transferring profits 
to jurisdictions with lower tax burdens, and IFRS adoption 
has facilitated this type of operation. Simone (2015) 
identified an average increase in profit transfers for tax 
reasons after IFRS adoption, given that the adoption of 
a single accounting standard by various countries has 
facilitated this type of transfer.
Table 6 presents the result for the association between 
IFRS adoption and tax avoidance controlling for book-tax 
conformity and total accruals. It is verified that the positive 
association between mandatory IFRS adoption and tax 
avoidance persists even when two possible explanatory 
factors for this relationship are controlled. This result 
indicates that, keeping the level of book-tax conformity 
and accruals constant, companies started to engage more 
in tax avoidance after IFRS adoption.
It is shown in Table 6 that total accruals are positively 
associated with tax avoidance in two of the regressions 
(1 and 2), which is consistent with Atwood et al. (2012) 
and indicates that part of the tax avoidance is achieved 
through accruals. For one of the regressions (3), total 
accruals are negatively associated with tax avoidance. 
This negative association can be explained by the inverse 
relationship between the metrics for these two variables. 
For the TA3 variable measurement, the higher the OCF, 
the higher the TA3 variable, and the higher the OCF, 
the lower total accruals are, thus identifying an inverse 
Table 5 Differentiated effects of International Financial Reporting Standards adoption on tax avoidance in high and low book-tax 
conformity environments
(1) (2) (3)
TA1 TA2 TA3
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
IFRS x HighBTaxC 0.066*** (27.193) 0.076*** (32.378) 0.069*** (26.307)
IFRS x LowBTaxC 0.0605*** (23.19) 0.0619*** (24.93) 0.0492*** (18.13)
BTaxC 0.0529*** (13.56) 0.0489*** (14.18) 0.0299*** (7.997)
TaxRate 0.9703*** (53.2) 1.005*** (61.21) 0.9706*** (51.29)
LegEnf -0.0284*** (-19.72) -0.0302*** (-23.31) -0.0208*** (-14.28)
InvRig 0.0279*** (29.56) 0.0271*** (31.38) 0.0182*** (19.35)
OwnConc -0.0987*** (-19.98) -0.1116*** (-24.17) -0.0651*** (-12.41)
PreTaxROA 0.1499*** (16.34) 0.2304*** (31.28) -0.203*** (-27.75)
LogSize -0.0078*** (-18.44) -0.0109*** (-29.01) -0.0109*** (-27.79)
Leverage 0.0577*** (11.17) 0.0408*** (9.209) 0.0661*** (15.59)
SalesGrth 0.0301*** (12.51) 0.0061*** (6.519) 0.005*** (5.547)
Constant -0.2951*** (-34.52) -0.2588*** (-27.36) -0.1924*** (-18.1)
Fixed Effect – Year Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effect – Industry Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.253 0.176 0.143
N 41,823 82,091 81,786
Equality of coefficients 
tests: IFRS x HighBTaxC =
IFRS x LowBTaxC
4.93** 36.50*** 59.03***
Note: this table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions that test the effect of IFRS adoption on tax avoidance in high 
and low book-tax conformity environments. It also presents the tests of coefficient equality for the variables IFRS x HighBTaxC 
and IFRS x LowBTaxC. The standard errors are robust in terms of heteroskedasticity.
BTaxC: measure of book-tax conformity; LegEnf: measure of legal enforcement; IFRS x HighBTaxC:  interaction between the 
dummy variables for IFRS adoption and for countries with a high level of conformity; IFRS x LowBTaxC: interaction between the 
dummy variables for IFRS adoption and for countries with a low level of conformity; InvRig: measure of investor rights; Leverage: 
measure of leverage; LogSize: measure of firm size; OwnConc: measure of ownership concentration; PreTaxROA: measure of 
profitability; SalesGrth: measure of sales growth; TA1, TA2, TA3: measures of tax avoidance; TaxRate: home-country statutory 
corporate income tax rate.
**, ***: 5% and 1% statistical significance, respectively.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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Table 6 Effects of International Financial Reporting Standards adoption on tax avoidance controlling for book-tax conformity and 
accruals
(1) (2) (3)
TA1 TA2 TA3
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
IFRS 0.058*** (23.085) 0.056*** (22.210) 0.046*** (17.069)
BTaxC 0.056*** (14.4) 0.063*** (17.03) 0.0427*** (10.74)
TotAcc 0.0195** (2.388) 0.0299*** (5.06) -0.0185*** (-3.071)
TaxRate 0.9723*** (47.21) 1.032*** (52.3) 0.9776*** (43.73)
LegEnf -0.0246*** (-15.26) -0.0221*** (-14.09) -0.013*** (-7.457)
InvRig 0.0254*** (23.49) 0.0272*** (25.85) 0.0157*** (13.95)
OwnConc -0.0892*** (-15.77) -0.1026*** (-18.29) -0.0514*** (-8.164)
PreTaxROA 0.1366*** (13.1) 0.2492*** (27.05) -0.2117*** (-23.69)
LogSize -0.0081*** (-16.74) -0.0114*** (-25.24) -0.0113*** (-24.25)
Leverage 0.0622*** (10.48) 0.0475*** (8.835) 0.0719*** (14.5)
SalesGrth 0.0303*** (10.59) 0.0063*** (4.772) 0.0052*** (4.094)
Constant -0.2972*** (-22.75) -0.2941*** (-26.59) -0.1784*** (-14.72)
Fixed Effect – Year Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effect – Industry Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.248 0.175 0.141
N 32,538 57,190 57,711
Note: this table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions that test the effect of IFRS adoption on tax avoidance 
controlling by book-tax conformity and total accruals. The standard errors are robust in terms of heteroskedasticity. 
BTaxC: measure of book-tax conformity; LegEnf: measure of legal enforcement; IFRS: dummy variable for IFRS adoption; InvRig: 
measure of investor rights; Leverage: measure of leverage; LogSize: measure of firm size; OwnConc: measure of ownership 
concentration; PreTaxROA: measure of profitability; SalesGrth: measure of sales growth; TA1, TA2, TA3: measures of tax 
avoidance; TaxRate: home-country statutory corporate income tax rate; TotAcc: measure of total accruals. 
***: 1% statistical significance.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
relationship between the way the TA3 and TotAcc variables 
are being measured.
It is observed that the result for mandatory IFRS 
adoption is essentially the same as for mandatory IFRS 
adoption in the regression in model 1, when there was no 
control for accruals. This result suggests that the positive 
association between IFRS adoption and tax avoidance is 
not only driven by engagement in tax avoidance through 
accruals management, but also by other mechanisms that 
do not involve accruals.
An increase in reported earnings, keeping the value 
of corporate income tax constant, and depending on the 
metric used, can result in an increase in tax avoidance, 
independently of the company being engaged in practices 
to reduce the value of income tax, which makes the use 
of total accruals essential for controlling this possible 
mechanical relationship. The result found indicates that 
the positive association between mandatory IFRS adoption 
and tax avoidance does not derive from a mechanical 
relationship resulting from possible increases in accruals 
occurring after IFRS adoption.
4.3 Robustness Tests
New tests were carried out to verify whether the 
results are robust for the temporal variation in the tax 
avoidance metrics proposed by Tang (2015) and the tax 
enforcement control. The TA2 and TA3 variables were 
estimated anually. However, Atwood et al. (2012) argue 
that there can be a significant variation from one year 
to the next in the effective tax rate and that considering 
annual tax avoidance does not minimize the effects of 
items that are reversed in only one year. Based on these 
arguments, the TA2 and TA3 variables were estimated 
over three years and all of the regression models were 
adjusted for the new tax avoidance variables, with all of 
the results remaining constant, with the exception of one 
of the tests of coefficient equality, which did not present 
any significance.
In order to verify whether the specific enforcement 
regarding the taxation questions could have an impact 
on the results found in this study, the legal enforcement 
metric for the country was substituted by the tax 
enforcement metric developed by Djankov, Ganser, 
Mcliesh, Ramalho, & Shleifer (2010). All of the regression 
models were adjusted for the tax enforcement variable and 
the results remained constant, with the exception of one 
the regressions of model 7, in which the BTaxC variable 
lost significance. It should be mentioned that the samples 
for these tests were a little smaller due to the lack of a tax 
enforcement variable for Pakistan, the observations for 
which were excluded from the tests.
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5. CONCLUSION
The main aim of this study is to identify the association 
between mandatory IFRS adoption around the world and 
levels of tax avoidance. Using three different metrics for 
tax avoidance and controlling factors at a country and firm 
level that have shown an association with tax avoidance 
in previous studies, results were found that suggest an 
increase in companies’ involvement in tax avoidance after 
mandatory IFRS adoption.
The study also seeks to investigate how the relationship 
between mandatory IFRS adoption and tax avoidance 
behaves when the level of book-tax conformity is kept 
constant, and how this relationship behaves in countries 
with high and low book-tax conformity. The results found 
indicate that after mandatory IFRS adoption companies 
started to engage more in tax avoidance even when the 
level of conformity between reported earnings and taxable 
income is kept constant. However, after IFRS adoption, 
those companies in countries with higher levels of book-
tax conformity started to engage more in tax avoidance 
than those in countries with lower levels of book-tax 
conformity.
This study also aims to discover if IFRS adoption has 
an impact on companies’ engagement in tax avoidance 
through accruals management practices, practices that 
do not involve accruals management, or both. The results 
found indicate that part of the tax avoidance is due to 
accruals management practices; however, the increase 
in engagement in tax avoidance by companies after IFRS 
adoption is also due to other mechanisms that do not 
involve accruals management, for example, operations 
in tax havens and profit transfers to subsidiaries in 
jurisdictions with lower tax burdens.
It is therefore concluded that after mandatory IFRS 
adoption companies start to engage more in tax avoidance, 
using both practices that involve accruals management 
and those that do not. The association between IFRS 
adoption and increased tax avoidance showed significance 
independently of the level of book-tax conformity required 
in the country and the volume of company accruals.
This study contributes to the literature on the effects of 
IFRS adoption and on the determinants of tax avoidance, 
as it identifies taxation effects for IFRS adoption and 
shows that the adoption of one accounting standard is 
associated with a higher level of company tax avoidance. 
It also contributes to the current debate about the costs 
and benefits of different levels of book-tax conformity, by 
identifying that independently of the level of conformity 
between reported earnings and taxable income, the level 
of tax avoidance increased after IFRS adoption. This study 
presents interesting results for governments, investors, and 
other market participants, in that it shows greater company 
engagement in tax avoidance after IFRS adoption.
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) highlight that the tax 
avoidance metrics that are used for the effective tax 
rate, even if measured over the long run, reflect all of 
the transactions that have any effect on a company’s tax 
liabilities and do not distinguish between real activities 
that have tax benefits, activities carried out specifically to 
reduce taxation, and tax benefits obtained via lobbying 
activities. This factor is presented as a limitation of this 
study. Another limitation of the study is the lack of 
any control for the incentives given to managers, given 
that previous studies have already shown that there is a 
relationship between these incentives and levels of tax 
avoidance.
Identifying the effects of IFRS adoption on tax 
avoidance in environments with different incentives related 
to institutional factors represents an interesting research 
opportunity. Previous studies show that IFRS adoption 
has different effects on the quality of the informational 
environment, depending on the institutional factors in 
the countries adopting this set of accounting norms. 
Thus, institutional factors may determine levels of tax 
avoidance, since depending on the incentives identified 
by a company, it may engage in different levels of tax 
avoidance.
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